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CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF A NATIONAL
BUDGET SYSTEM
Public finance possesses the elements of a science in itself,
distinct from the field of economics of which broadly speaking
it is usually considered a part. It is also vitally related to polit-
ical science since it is one of the chief concerns of the state to
raise the revenue necessary for its subsistence and to expend it
in the proper manner and for legitimate purposes. It has its
sanction, sometimes called the "budget right," in the organic
law of the state. Some of the great struggles for constitutional
government throughout the world may be traced in the history
of public finance.
It is the common practice of governments, other than that
of the United States, to deal with their public moneys through
what is known as the budget system. This means a carefully
prepared and co6rdinated scheme of finance dealing in summary
and in detail, with the annual expenditures and receipts. This
constitutes the business program of the government, drawn up
by the executive departments under the supervision and control
of the Treasury, and presented to the legislature for ratification
upon the responsibility of the executive. The whole plan of
finance is dealt with as a unit and is called "the budget"
This system lends itself the more readily to those countries
having the parliamentary system of government where the execu-
tive possesses the right of legislative initiative, actively partici-
pates in legislation on the floor of the legislature, and through
the prime minister as party leader controls the legislative output.
In no two countries does it operate along identical lines. For
example, in Germany the Imperial Chancellor, on behalf of the
Emperor, exercises a much stronger control over financial legis-
lation than does the executive in England or France.
Our institutions being more nearly akin to those of England,
it is to the English budget system that we more naturally look
for the purpose of illustration. Here the estimates of revenues
and of expenditures are prepared each year under the supervision
and control of the Treasury and approved by the cabinet. These
estimates form the financial program of the government. They
are introduced into the House of Commons as a project of legisla-
tion and are treated as a bill. The cabinet are members of the
House (or Lords). They include the Prime Minister as leader
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of the majority party, the Chancellor of the Exchequer who
represents the Treasury, and all of the heads of the great execu-
tive departments.
No changes are made in the government's program of finance
without the government's consent. Any enforced change in the
face of government opposition, on any serious item, would lead
to the resignation of the cabinet or to a new election. The House
of Commons inherently possesses complete control over all finan-
cial legislation. It has, however, by a standing order,' dating
from 1713, yielded the initiative in financial legislation to the
cabinet, at the same time holding the executive branch of the
government to a strict responsibility for the expenditure of
the money in exact accordance with the terms of the parlia-
mentary grant.
The budget in England is ordinarily ratified as introduced.
Parliamentary control is exercised through its Select Committee
on Estimates, its Public Accounts Committee, and the Comptrol-
ler and Auditor-General who is a parliamentary officer. The
budget is treated as a unit in all of its stages-as to preparation,
ratification, execution, audit and control.
The provisions of the Constitution of the United States relating
to public finance are as follows:
"All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the
House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose
or concur with amendments as on other bills."'-(Art. I,
Sec. 7.)
"The Congress shall have power to lay and-collect taxes,
duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide
for the common defense and general welfare of the
United States ...... .................
To borrow money on the credit of the United States.
To raise and support armies, but no appropriation to
that use shall be for a longer term than two years.
To provide and maintain a Navy."--(Art. I, Sec. 8.)
"No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in
consequence of appropriations made by law: and a regular
statement and account of the receipts and expenditures
of all public money shall be published from time to
time."--(Art. I, Sec. 9.)
"The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes
on incomes, from whatever source derived, without appor-
tionment among the several states, and without regard to
any census or enumeration."-(Art. XVI.)
'S. 0. 66. See also: May's Parliamentary Practice, ilith ed., p. 545.
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As bearing indirectly on the subject of public finance the
following provisions may also be cited:
The Congress shall have power "to make all laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution
the foregoing powers, and all the powers vested by this
Constitution in the government of the United States, or
any department or officer thereof."-(Art. I, Sec. 8.)
"Each House may determine the rules of its proceed-
ings."--(Art. I, Sec. 5.)
The President "shall from time to time give to the
Congress information of the state of the Union, and
recommend to their consideration such measures as he
shall judge necessary and expedient; ........ . he
shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed."--
(Art. II, Sec. 3.)
These provisions constitute the budget right of the federal
government. The strategic position of the Congress can be
readily seen. Its control over every phase of financial legislation
is complete. The executive, save his power of veto, is made
responsible only for giving the Congress information, for recom-
mending measures, and for the execution of the laws. He is
not, by virtue of the expressed letter of the Constitution, made
a participant in legislation.
As contrasted with the development of financial procedure in
foreign countries, the Congress of the United States has followed
a policy of increasing decentralization. There was created in
1795 the Ways and Means Committee. It was made a standing
committee for each session until 18o2, when it was made a per-
manent standing committee.
From the time of its creation until 1865 the Ways and Means
Committee had charge of all of the bills for the raising of
revenue and all of the annual appropriation bills. The whole
plan of finance was thus in the hands of one committee of the
House. In 1865 the Appropriations Committee was created to
take over all bills relating to expenditures, leaving to the Ways
and Means Committee its present function of dealing with
revenue bills only. In 1883 the Committee on Rivers and Har-
bors was created to take over all bills relating to the improve-
ment of rivers and harbors.
In 1885 the present committee system of appropriating money
was established. Bills relating to appropriations for the follow-
ing services were taken away from the Committee on Appropria-
tions and distributed as follows: For the diplomatic and
consular service to the Committee on Foreign Affairs; for the
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military establishment to the Committee on Military Affairs; for
the naval establishment to the Committee on Naval Affairs; for
the Indian service to the Committee on Indian Affairs; for pen-
sions to the Committee on Pensions; for the Post Office to the
Committee on Post Offices and Post Roads; for the Department
of Agriculture to the Committee on Agriculture; for claims
against the government to the Committee on Claims. This left
in the hands of the Appropriations Committee the following
bills: Legislative, executive, and judicial appropriations; sundry
civil appropriations; fortifications; District of Columbia; and
the deficiencies appropriations.2
Thus it is seen that the work of financial legislation of the
House is divided among nine different committees. These Comr-
mittees work independently of each other. There is no attempt
at co6rdination in relation to expenditures and no possibility of
co6rdination of revenues and expenditures, since the Committee
on Ways and Means has no organic connection with the spend-
ing committees. No plan of finance is presented in advance;
in fact there is no unified plan at all. A complete view of the
financial legislation of the government cannot be obtained until
after the close of the session of Congress. There is no preview
and no co6rdination. There is retrospect only.
The executive as such has no responsibility for the nation's
finances except to spend the grants according to law. He may
make recommendations to the Congress for certain financial legis-
lation but these are treated as suggestions only. He may also
exercise his power of veto over a financial measure of which
he disapproves. The relation of the Secretary of the Treasury
to public finance is clerical. He has no active control over any
of the vital processes. The annual book of estimates of expen-
ditures do not form a part of the legislative program. The
Secretary has no power to criticise or revise them. They are
submitted to Congress just as they come from the heads of the
various departments. There is no attempt at co6rdination. They
are not really estimates but are requests from the spending
departments for funds for another year, the request from one
department being unrelated to the request from another.
The spending committees of the Congress treat these so called
estimates as suggestions-but suggestions not from the Secretary
of the Treasury but from the heads of the departments con-
cerned. In preparing a given appropriation bill the committee
'See The Need for a National Budget. H. R. Doc. 854, 62d Congress,
2d Session, p. 94, ff.
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calls the head of the department before it and submits him to
a cross examination. They may also examine a number of other
persons interested. They then proceed to draft the bill as they
see fit. This process goes on simultaneously in the nine com-
mittees of the House and is often repeated in corresponding
committees of the Senate. After the bills have been thus pre-
pared and reported they are still subject to amendment, and to
the addition of new items even to the complete alteration of the
bill by private members on the floor.
The Congress therefore has -for more than a century exercised
complete control over all phases of the financial program. It
treats money bills as other bills, exercising the legislative initiative
in respect to them also.
Now it is proposed to supplant the present system by a national
budget system. And in this connection we are not considering
here the compromise proposed whereby the Congress will exer-
cise all of its present powers through a budget committee or
through an enlarged and reorganized appropriations committee.
The budget system ordinarily advocated involves, as its prime
factor, the relinquishing of the initiative in financial legislation
to the executive by the Congress.
What constitutional changes would be effected in the accom-
plishment of such an aim? In the first place the executive
branch of the government would occupy a new preeminence in
our constitutional system. The President would possess the func-
tions of a Prime Minister in relation to public finance. He would
take the responsibility for the preparation of the budget. Com-'
plementary to this the Congress would yield its power of amend-
ment by way of increasing any item in the budget, and also its
power to introduce any bill making a charge upon the Treasury,
without the consent of the executive. The President therefore
would, through the Cabinet, settle all matters of financial policy,
and prepare in advance of the sitting of the Congress a complete
unified financial program-a budget-cobrdinating the estimates
of the spending departments, and balancing proposed expendi-
tures with estimated and proposed revenues.
This budget would be made public at the opening of the Con-
gress each year. The Congress would retain the power of
complete control by ratifying it and seeing that no money was
spent except in strict accordance with the legislative grant. The
work of the Congress would be greatly simplified. The time
of the committees would be devoted more largely to substantive
legislation leaving the technique of departmental finance to be
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worked out by the experts in the various spending departments,
under Treasury supervision.
The position of the Secretary of the Treasury would have a
new meaning. Its function would cease to be merely clerical
and administrative. The Secretary of the Treasury would
become the finance minister of the United States, and as such
would occupy a position of tremendous importance in our con-
stitutional system. Although the President would, in theory, be
responsible for the budget, the Secretary would bear the chief
burden and exercise the actual authority.
He would, in behalf of the Treasury, become immediately
responsible for the estimates of expenditures. They would be
prepared under his supervision. He would have the ultimate
decision, outside of matters of policy, of all new projects making
a charge upon the Treasury, all increases over the previous
appropriations, and over the renewal of the existing grants.
Instead of appearing before the committees or sub-committees
of the Congress, the heads of the spending departments would
submit all of their proposals to him for approval. The detailed
annual estimates which are now submitted to the Congress
through him in an unrevised form would be submitted to his
office. Here they would be examined by experts, scrutinized,
criticised, and co6rdinated into a unified annual program to be
approved by the Secretary and, as to policy, by the Cabinet. The
Treasury would at all times keep in close touch with the spend-
ing departments in order intelligently to pass upon their proposed
expenditures.
Thus the Secretary of the Treasury would control the budget
in its preparatory stage. This means that under the national
budget system he would in fact become the initiatory force in
all financial legislation, a position vastly superior to the one he
now holds.
His control over the expenditures in the fighting branches of
the government, Army, Navy and Fortifications, would naturally
be of a perfunctory nature, as these expenditures involve matters
of high policy as well as a peculiar professional skill and tech-
nique which could only be intelligently acted upon by the heads
of these branches. His relations to these would be to present
the condition of the Treasury and see that no projects are under-
taken which cannot be met out of existing or proposed funds.
The Secretary of the Treasury, in addition to control over the
preparation of the estimates of expenditures, would also at the
same time prepare estimates of the revenues which the existing
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system of taxation would bring in. If they appeared insufficient
to meet the estimated expenditures he would have to devise, under
the direction of the President, new methods of meeting the defi-
ciency. If they appeared in excess of expenditures he would
propose certain reductions in taxation. His duty would be to
see that revenues balanced with expenditures, striving on the one
hand to avoid a deficit and on the other a surplus.
This work of the Secretary of the Treasury would precede the
meeting of the Congress in December. The budget would be
prepared, approved by the President and the Cabinet, and sub-
mitted to the Congress early in December. It would contain in
summary and in detail the whole scheme of governmental finance
for the coming fiscal year both as to money to be spent and
revenues to be raised. The executive branch of the government,
to whom the money is to be entrusted for expenditure, would
assume responsibility to the Congress and to the people for the
budget.
The budget would be introduced into the House as a bill. It
would go through the usual stages. Its passage would mean
the ratification of the government's program.
Another innovation in this connection in our constitutional
system is the proposal that the members of the cabinet be granted
a seat in the House and a voice, but not a vote, in the proceed-
ings relative to the budget. This procedure would follow as a
necessary consequence upon the adoption of the budget system.
It would be the program of the executive branch of the govern-
ment. There would be many items of a technical nature to be
explained and questions of governmental policy to be defended.
This need would be met by having the proper representatives of
the government present to meet criticisms, to answer questions,
and to make the desired explanations.
Thus we see that the implications of a budget system are
increased power and responsibility for the President, a new func-
tion for the Cabinet in deciding matters of financial policy and
in representing them on the floor of the House, a real responsi-
bility on the Secretaries of War and Navy respectively for
expenditures, and an elevation of the position of the Secretary
of the Treasury to that of finance minister in a real sense of the
word. So much for the executive branch of the government.
On the other hand the committee system of making appropria-
tions would cease. The budget bill would be recognized as an
administration measure. The Congress would relinquish its
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power to add any new item, to increase any item, or to consider
any measure which would impose a burden upon the Treasury
unless such a measure had the sanction of the executive.
Granting that the adoption of such a system is desirable, could
it be accomplished under the present terms of the constitution?
Is it possible under the general provisions of the constitution to
develop a system of procedure to which a national budget system
as above indicated could be adopted? Apropos of this discussion
we have seen that the present committee system of financial pro-
cedure in the Congress rests upon no higher authority than the
rules of the House and the Senate, the ultimate basis being the
general provision of the Constitution that each house shall have
the power to determine the rules of its own proceedings. 3
The constitution has imposed upon the President the obligation
of periodically informing the Congress as to the state of the
Union. Here is a strong point of contact for budgetary pro-
cedure. Coupled with the provision that he shall recommend to
the Congress such measures as appear to him necessary and expe-
dient (Art. II, Sec. 3), we are given a basis for the exercise
of the initiative by the executive in financial legislation. He
can and does now appear before the Congress and in person
advocates the passage of legislation. A special adaptation of
this procedure could easily be made applicable to budgetary
legislation.
In order to make effective the complete executive initiative
in budgetary legislation a simple but radical change in the rules
of the House and of the Senate would have to be made. This
is the crux of the whole matter. The present committee system
of financial control would have to be abolished. A new rule
would have to be adopted which would provide in effect that no
charge shall be made upon the Treasury except upon the request
of the executive. A similar rule would follow fixing the
authority of the executive to provide revenues. This would
mean that the Congress would relinquish the power to consider
money bills other than those introduced upon the authority of
the President.
Supplementary to this a further rule could be made extending
the privileges of the floor to the members of the Cabinet. The
vote of course could not be extended, but under the budget
system the actual vote is not necessary. The personal presence
'Art. I, Sec. 5.
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of the President's representatives with a voice in the discussion
of the budget, especially as to explanation and defense, is
sufficient.
The passage of one statute would be needed to strengthen the
control of the Treasury especially over the initiatory budgetary
processes. The Secretary of the Treasury would have to be
thus empowered to classify, revise, reduce, and co~rdinate the
departmental estimates and stand responsible for them. In like
manner would be made his authority over the revenues. The
Congress has the power to do this under the general provisions
of the Constitution above cited.4
The Congress can alter its method of procedure relative to
the business before it, and can provide by statute for the further
limitation of its power by delegating certain functions to certain
executive officers, but the Congress cannot escape its constitu-
tional responsibilitiy for the ultimate control over the nation's
purse. The constitution specifically provides that "no money
shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence of appro-
priations made by law" (Art. I, Sec. 9) and that "the Congress
shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties ..... ... to
borrow money ...... ... to support armies, .......
to maintain a navy" (Art. I, Sec. 8). The authority to levy the
tax and the authority to appropriate money must forever remain
with the Congress. There appears nothing here, however, which
would in any way obstruct or limit the operation of the budget
system.
From the foregoing situation it appears quite feasible to adopt
a complete national budget system without making any change
in our written Constitution. A few amendments to existing
statutes and few changes in the rules of the House and Senate
would provide the necessary modus operandi. The transition, so
far as its legal phases are concerned, could be made easily and
quickly.
There are, however, practical difficulties besetting the inaugu-
ration of so radical a change in our methods of procedure in
financial legislation. We have always clung to the constitutional
theory of separate and co~rdinate governmental powers. The
constitution was framed under that influence. It has been handed
down as a tradition. It has made itself felt in the governmental
organizations of our states and even in the lesser units of counties
and cities. How then could we reconcile the apparent giving
"Art I, Sec. 8.
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over to the executive a part of the legislative power, with our
traditional theories of constitutional government?
There is a point of contact in our governmental practice
where this tradition may be re-examined and clarified. It lies
in the extra-legal field of party activity. The development of
the political party as a determining factor in national legislation
has been considered largely from the practical rather than the
philosophical point of view. We have never legally recognized
party responsibility for legislation, yet we do hold the party in
power responsible, in a loose sort of a way, for whatever legis-
lation is passed. From the party standpoint the President, and
his Cabinet, have one and the same interest with the members
of the majority party in the Congress. The President is recog-
nized as the leader of his party. To his party he has a very
definite function and responsibility. In consultation with his
Cabinet and other members of his party, he formulates the party
program. He assumes the responsibility to the country for the
work of his party. He does actually participate in the legislation
of the Congress by having bills introduced which are regarded as
administrative bills and by insisting on certain legislative meas-
ures to which he considers his party pledged. -
Now here is the point of contact with the budget system. It
involves a closer application of party responsibility in the partic-
ular field of public finance. Recognize the party as the working
unit in legislation and legalize the position of the executive as
party leader in financial legislation. The party in power is
already, in fact, held responsible for the taxes it levies and the
money it spends. It is only a short step to localize this responsi-
bility on the shoulders of the executive and give it a definite
constitutional status.
In this manner we could effectively adopt the budget system
without adopting the so-called parliamentary form of govern-
ment. The Congress would not lose any of its constitutional
powers. It would retain a strict control over the nation's finances
since no money could pass into or out of the Treasury without
its ratification. It would also see that no money was diverted-
from the purpose for which it was granted. The actual financial
program would be given over to the executive to prepare, to
initiate into the Congress and to execute after the Congress has
given its formal approval.
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